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ABSTRACT 
This paper responds to a number of criticisms of Dempster-Shafer theory made 
by Judea Pearl. He criticises Dempster-Shafer belief or not obeying the laws of 
Bayesian belief," however, these laws lead to well-known problems in the face of 
ignorance, and seem unreasonably restrictive. It is argued that it is not reasonable 
to expect a measure of belief to obey Pearl's sandwich principle. The standard 
representation of "'if-then" rules in Dempster-Shafer theory, criticised by Pearl, is 
justified and favorably contrasted with a conditional probability representation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Judea Pearl's most challenging and stimulating paper raises a number of 
very important issues about belief functions and uncertain inference in general. 
Pearl's main criticisms can be summarized as follows: 
1. Dempster-Shafer belief in proposition a can be interpreted as the 
probability that the evidence proves a. Pearl asks why the probability of 
provability should be used rather than just the probability. 
2. He points out that constraints on probability functions can usually not be 
represented by a belief function. 
3. He criticizes the conditioning in Dempster-Shafer theory. 
4. Dempster-Shafer belief is shown not to obey the "sandwich principle," 
which Pearl argues is a fundamental principle of plausible reasoning. 
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5. He claims that the Dempster-Shafer representation f rules has counter- 
intuitive properties. 
This reply first argues that the use of probability can be problematic; in 
particular, a single probability function is not always adequate for representing 
someone's degree of belief. Dempster's rule of conditioning is then contrasted, 
by use of an example, with Bayesian updating. The sandwich principle is 
examined, and it is found that measures of belief and support generally do not 
obey this principle, and I conclude that it certainly cannot be regarded as a 
general principle of plausible reasoning. It is then shown that the standard 
representation f rules in the Dempster-Shafer theory has a simple and natural 
semantics, and some major problems with other representations of rules that 
Pearl prefers are indicated. 
2. PROBLEMS WITH PROBABILITY 
Perhaps Pearl's most fundamental question is why a probability-based 
measure such as Dempster-Shafer belief should be used to measure belief 
rather than just a probability: "Shouldn't we really be concerned with the 
likelihood that a component is faulty as opposed to the likelihood that it can be 
proven faulty?" (P.6). 1 But the requirement that a measure of belief should be 
a probability function is very restrictive; in particular, in the case where we 
have very little knowledge about some proposition a, it prevents us from 
allocating small degrees of belief to both a and --, a. 
In this discussion of some problems of probability, I will focus on the 
Bayesian approach; maximum entropy and lower probability will be mentioned 
in the next section. 
In the field of uncertainty in AI there has been very substantial progress in 
both theoretical and applications-based work on Bayesian methods (due in no 
small way to Pearl himself), for example, Pearl [1], Lauritzen and Spiegelhal- 
ter [2], and many papers given at recent uncertainty workshops [3]. Yet despite 
this important work, there are still the same familiar fundamental problems 
with the Bayesian approach. 
2.1. Representation of Ignorance--The Frame Problem 
Let a be the proposition that I live on Cowley Road, Oxford. I imagine that 
the reader is pretty ignorant about the truth of a. How would you construct 
Pr(a), your Bayesian belief in a? 
First you must choose a frame O (of mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
propositions) and a subset A of O representing the proposition a; and then 
tThis refers to Section 6of Pearl's paper, Int. J. Approx. Reasoning 4(5/6), 363-390, 1990. 
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presumably ou would use the principle of indifference to arrive at your 
Bayesian belief in a. The problem is that there are any number of frames that 
you could choose; for example, 
1. O = {x l, x2}, A = {xl}. The principle of indifference gives Pr(A) to 
be 0.5. 
2. Or you could estimate that there are about 100,000 roads or streets in 
central England, and so pick O = {x l, x 2 . . . . .  Xl0o.00o} with again 
A = {xl} and the other xi's representing the other streets. Then the 
principle of indifference gives Pr(A) = 0.00001. 
Neither of these frames seems unreasonable, but the probability assigned to a 
is crucially dependent upon which frame is chosen. Sometimes there will be a 
clearly natural choice of frame: a unique frame such that all of its elements 
seem equipossible, for example, when considering the result of throwing a die, 
but often there will be no such "canonical" frame. A very basic requirement 
of an uncertainty calculus is that it should give logically equivalent proposi- 
tions the same measure; the example above shows that probability fails in this 
requirement. One's Bayesian belief is thus a function not only of the informa- 
tion given and one's background knowledge, but also of a sometimes arbitrary 
choice of frame. An adequate measure of belief for this situation would not 
depend on the choice of frame; for example, Dempster-Shafer o a lower 
probability approach would lead to beliefs of 0 for both a and -~ a. 
The above example suggests that Bayesian belief does not correspond to all 
one's intuitions about belief. Having a Bayesian belief of 0.99999 in -~a does 
not mean that one can be almost certain that a is false; in the above example, 
one would arrive at that degree of belief by choosing frame 2, but the choice 
could have been arbitrary, and perhaps if the same question had been asked a 
few seconds later the other frame would have been chosen, giving a belief 
of 0.5. 
There is an analogous problem in the infinite frame case. For example, if 
one is attempting to predict ertiary protein structure (Clark et al. [4]), using a 
Bayesian approach requires one to produce a prior distribution on the very 
large dimensional space of all tertiary structures for proteins, about which we 
are largely ignorant (and then update this using the evidences). But if a uniform 
prior is used, then the probability of events in the space will depend radically 
on the choice of one of the infinite number of parameterizations of the space; 
again there is no canonical or "correct" parameterization, and with some 
parameterizations a given event will have prior probability almost 1, but with 
others almost 0. 
Complete ignorance is a rather extreme case, but in a large complex frame 
there is almost certainly some ignorance, and the same problem occurs. A 
related problem occurs with likelihoods. In the Dempster-Shafer theory one 
can very naturally represent a piece of evidence supporting a proposition a but 
saying nothing extra about any subpropositions of a, or about ~a, a point 
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made by Gordon and Shortliffe [5]. In a Bayesian approach, using a frame O 
and subset A to represent a, one would model such evidence by using a 
likelihood function constant over A (Pearl [6]). But in this Bayesian represen- 
tation the evidence supports each x e A equally, which is not the same at all as 
evidence supporting A and saying nothing else about x eA.  A sort of 
"principle of indifference" is being used to split support for A equally among 
the singletons; to be precise, if e represents this evidence, then for each 
x~A,  Pr(el x) is set to Pr(e I A), which is exactly what we wanted to avoid 
doing! 
The likelihood function (as well as the prior function) is effectively a 
function only of the elementary propositions (the x's) and not of the whole 
Boolean algebra of propositions, and so it cannot represent such evidence 
entirely adequately. 
2.2. The Propagation of Wayward Priors 
The Bayesian problem with ignorant priors would perhaps not matter much 
if the problem disappeared as soon as evidence arrived. This, however, is not 
the case; unless the evidence is extremely strong, so that all but one possibility 
is virtually eliminated, the prior is still very important. 
Bayes' rule, in odds-likelihood form is Oe(h) = Le(h)O(h), where O(h) 
is the prior odds for hypothesis h, Oe(h) the posterior odds after receiv- 
ing evidence e, and L~(h)=-Pr(e[ h)/Pr(e[-~h) the likelihood ratio for 
evidence . 
An immediate consequence of this equation is that if an expert modifies his 
prior odds for some h by a factor k, that is, he replaces his prior odds O(h) 
by O'(h) = kO(h), then his posterior odds for h will be changed by the same 
factor, that is, Oe(h) = kOe(h). Typically the prior probability for h is an 
estimate of the proportion of the time the expert expects h to occur in those 
circumstances (e.g., what proportion of patients who come into the surgery 
have disease h). With a large frame it can very easily happen that an expert 
"misjudges" his priors by an order of magnitude, and sometimes considerably 
more, especially if a principle of indifference had to be used. This means that 
the posterior odds can be trusted up to, at best, an order of magnitude. If the 
evidence very strongly supports hypothesis h leading to posterior probability 
0.999, then an order of magnitude difference ither way in the prior odds will 
only lead to a range of posterior probabilities [0.99, 0.9999] so the prior makes 
little difference, but if we get a posterior probability of 0.5 it should be 
remembered that one order of magnitude variation in prior odds would lead to 
posterior probabilities between (roughly) 0.1 and 0.9. 
The logical conclusion seems, then, to be that a Bayesian should allow for a 
range of priors leading to a range of posteriors, perhaps using the infimum of 
these values as the measure of belief. This is then a lower probability 
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approach, and this measure of belief, as shown in Section 5.4, spoils the 
sandwich principle. 
3. INCOMPLETENESS 
Pearl argues (P.2) that one usually cannot represent a set of probabilistic 
constraints by a belief function. This is not surprising because belief functions 
are very special ower probability functions, ones with a nonnegative M6bius 
inverse (mass function). It is clear from the papers of Dempster and Shafer that 
the Dempster-Shafer theory was never intended for this purpose. However, 
belief functions do represent a very natural form of "incomplete knowledge" 
--when we have a probability function on a space fl and wish to extend this 
via a compatibility relation to another space O (Shafer [7]). 
The problems of representation of ignorance by a probability distribution 
discussed in the preceding section were caused by not having information to 
determine a single probability function, which is "incompleteness" in Pearl's 
sense. Representation of evidence supporting a nonelementary proposition, 
also discussed in Section 2, is another very important form of "incomplete 
knowledge," which Dempster-Shafer theory deals with in a very natural way. 
A major weakness of this section of Pearl's paper is the omission of any 
discussion of alternative approaches to representation of incomplete knowl- 
edge. I will briefly discuss two of these other approaches. 
Bayesians either seem to refuse to acknowledge the existence of incomplete 
knowledge, expecting their expert to be able to produce a complete set of 
probabilities no matter how ignorant hey are, or use the principle of indiffer- 
ence or a generalization, maximum entropy. The very serious problems caused 
by dependence on the choice of frame have been mentioned in Section 2. 
3.1. Maximum Entropy 
Pearl makes a very misleading statement (P.2) when he states that the 
maximum entropy approach (Jaynes [8]) allows "the missing probabilities [to] 
be recovered." If the constraints on a probability function P allow one to 
deduce only that P e :~, a family of probability functions, then any rule that 
picks a single probability function PI ~ ~ is almost certain to produce the 
wrong one and may well not even be close. Maximum entropy is such a rule, 
which has nice mathematical properties (and also some odd ones) (Paris and 
Vencovslai [9, 10])--but it would be a great mistake to consider that the single 
probability function it produces could summarize :~ at all adequately. 
Take O = {x, y} and the constraint on P (on O), 0.05 _< P(x) <- 0.45, 
and let ~ be the set of probability functions on O compatible with this 
constraint. We might decide to pick Pl e :~ with P~(x) = 0.25, but it must 
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be remembered that this Pt is no more correct than any other member of 
~----we certainly have not recovered the missing probability. 
In fact, maximum entropy picks probability function P2 with P2(x) = 0.45, 
which is a long way from some members of ~ .  What maximum entropy does 
is to pick the probability function P ~ ~ that is closest, in a particular sense, 
to Po, the uniform distribution. However, if there is more than one reasonable 
choice of frame (a common situation), then P0 loses its special status, and so 
finding the P closest o Po is of very dubious value. 
3.2. Upper and Lower Probability 
Upper and lower probability approaches (e.g., Smith [11], Nilsson [12], van 
der Gaag [13]) seem a natural way to deal with incomplete probabilistic 
information. There do appear to be complexity problems, though, and the 
resulting intervals can be disappointingly weak. A possible solution to this 
latter problem might be to make extra independence assumptions. 
4. DEMPSTER OR BAYESIAN UPDATING? 
Pearl criticizes the method used in the Dempster-Shafer theory for updating 
with certain evidence, Dempster's rule of conditioning, and others have also 
expressed misgivings (e.g., Kyburg [14], Fagin and Halpern [15]). Consider- 
ing a belief function Bel as a lower probability, the infimum of a particular 
family ~ of probability functions [Be l (A)= in fp~P(A) ] ,  leads to an 
alternative way of conditioning on certain evidence B: The conditioned 
function is defined to be the infimum of the conditioned family, Bel( A II B) = 
infp~ ~ P(A[B) .  Kyburg calls such updating Bayesian. Pearl refers to it as 
"straight conditioning" (P.3.1) and "FH conditioning" (P.3.3). It has also 
been considered by Dempster [16], De Campos et al. [17], Fagin and Halpern 
[15], Jaffray [18]. Dempster's rule of conditioning differs from Bayesian 
conditioning by making some natural assumptions. This is illustrated in the 
following example. 
A doctor states that a certain person is anemic (proposition a). Model the 
doctor as a randomly reliable source or sometimes reliable truth machine 
(Shafer and Tversky [19], Shafer [7]) so that he has two modes, reliable and 
unreliable, and if he is reliable then what he says is true, but if he is unreliable 
then we don't know whether his statement is true or not. Suppose our 
subjective probability that he is reliable is 0.95. 
We then observe that the patient is a Bayesian (proposition b), which we 
treat as certain evidence. Let E t represent the event hat the doctor is reliable, 
and let fll = {El, ~El}; let E z be the event hat the observation is reliable; 
let f12 = {E2, ~E2} and f] = f~l × fi2- By the definition of a randomly 
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reliable source, E I implies a and E 2 implies b. Let the frame O = { a ^  b, 
a^ -~b, -~aAb, -~a^ -~b}. 
Consider the situation before we observe his Bayesianism. Using a Demp- 
ster-Shafer approach, we construct a probability function Pl on fll and 
extend it to a belief function over O. Our information about the reliability of 
the doctor means that we should take Pl(El) = 0.95, which leads to a belief 
function Bel I over O with Bell(a ) = 0.95. 
A lower probability approach would treat the doctor's evidence as a con- 
straint on the probability functions on O: Pr(a) >_ 0.95, leading to the same 
belief function Bel I on O. The two approaches so far are essentially equiva- 
lent; the difference comes when we condition on the observation. 
In a Dempster-Shafer approach, we construct a probability function P on fl 
summarizing the two evidences and then extend this to a belief function Bel 
over O. Dempster's rule of conditioning makes the "irrelevance" assumption 
that since the two evidences are not conflicting, the probability of E 1 should 
not be affected by learning the second evidence, that is, P(E1) = Pl(Ei) = 
0.95. This leads to Bell(a[ b), which is by definition Bel(a), equalling 0.95. 
Bayesian conditioning does not make this assumption; instead, Bell(all b) =- 
P.(a[ b) = 0. 2 
Dempster's conditioning leads to a more intuitive result in this case by 
making a sensible default assumption. There will, however, be times when 
other assumptions may be more appropriate, leading to a different probability 
function P on fl and in turn to a different belief function on O, and sometimes 
we should perhaps allow for a family of probability functions on [2 and hence a 
family of belief functions on O, as Pearl suggests (P.5). 
5. THE SANDWICH PRINCIPLE 
The sandwich principle, suggested by Pearl to be a fundamental principle of 
plausible reasoning, may be paraphrased as follows: 
If  Belf is a measure of "degree of belief," then, for any given situation and 
for any propositions a and b, it should be the case that Belf(a) is between, 
or equal to one of, Belf(a[ b) and Bel f (a l~b) ,  where Belf(a I b) is the 
conditional belief in a given b. 
At first sight, aside from the fact that terms degree of  belief and conditional 
belief have not be defined, this seems plausible; no one will argue that it is a 
mathematical truth for probabilities measuring ratios of frequencies. But why 
should it apply to a measure of belief? 
2Also, P.(a[-~b) = 0, spoiling the sandwich principle. 
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With a Dempster-Shafer approach, since receiving either a piece of certain 
evidence b or certain evidence ~ b reduces uncertainty in our knowledge, it 
can happen that either will increase our belief in a. Conversely, both b and 
b may contradict (different) evidences that support a, and so sometimes it is 
the case that Belf(a) > Belf(a I b), Belf(a I~b), also violating the sandwich 
principle. 
Although Pearl criticizes Dempster-Shafer belief for not obeying the sand- 
wich principle, he also faces difficulties. Pearl's version of the Bayesian theory 
involves the consideration of a family ~ of probability functions (P.5). To 
make sense of the sandwich principle for this situation we have to define a 
function Belf measuring belief, based on the information given by ~.  Perhaps 
the most obvious measure is lower probability, but this violates the sandwich 
principle (see Section 5.4). However, using maximum entropy to pick Belf 
means that it can depend on arbitrary choice of frame; also, considering 
maximum entropy on a conditioned family of probability functions leads to a 
violation of the sandwich principle. 
For a set of probability functions ~,  let :~ME represent the maximum 
entropy probability function for ~.  Let O = { a,-~a} × { b,-~b}, and let 
~= {P on O: P(a) = 0.2}. Conditioning ~ on new evidence b gives 
~b = {Pb: Pc  ~},  which is the set of all probability functions on {a, -~a}. 
Then ~ME(a) = 0.2, but (~b)ME(a) = (~b)ME(a) = 0.5, thUS violating the 
sandwich principle. 
One could also define the conditioned belief as just ordinary conditioning of 
the probability function ~ME, which, of course, does obey the sandwich 
principle. But with this definition, belief is not a function just of the family of 
probability functions; when we update with certain evidence b, our new 
measure of belief in a no longer has the same relationship with ~a as our 
initial belief in a had with ~.  
Even if someone were to accept the sandwich principle as a principle of 
plausible reasoning, it doesn't necessarily mean that they shouldn't use Demp- 
ster-Shafer theory. With each belief function is associated the set of compati- 
ble probability functions (see, e.g., Dempster [16] and Section 4 of my reply to 
Shafer's paper). So making a decision (using Dempster's approach) requires 
considering a family of probability functions, just as Pearl must; it does not 
matter if we call the infimum of this family a "measure of belief" or not 
(though I happen to find it intuitive to do so). 
In Section 5.1 it is argued that a function measuring the measure of  support 
given by the evidence should spoil the sandwich principle, and also that the 
sandwich principle is incompatible with an adequate representation f igno- 
rance. The likelihood ratio is rather like such a measure, so it is not surprising 
that it too spoils the sandwich principle; but since, given a state of prior 
ignorance, Bayesian probability can generally be considered as just normalized 
likelihoods, why, then, does Bayesian probability not spoil the sandwich 
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principle? This is explored in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 shows how the sandwich 
principle fails to hold in another probabilistic framework, and Section 5.4 that 
lower probability also spoils the sandwich principle. Finally, in 5.5 an example 
is given in which the use of a measure of belief that does not spoil the 
sandwich principle will give a very counterintuitive r sult and so questions 
whether any measure of belief should obey the sandwich principle. 
5.1. Measures of Support Violate the Sandwich Principle 
Let Supp be a function from an algebra of propositions to [0, 1] that is 
intended to represent the support hat the evidence we have received gives to 
propositions. Supp is also meant o be such that if proposition a is established 
with certainty, then Supp(a)= 1, and if a is not supported at all by any 
evidence, then Supp(a) = 0. 
Let a and c be logically independent propositions and b the proposition 
a ¢* c. (Some may be more comfortable with the problem expressed in terms 
of a frame O; for example, we could set (9 = {u, o, w, x, y, z}, represent a
by the set {u, z}, b by {u, v, w}, and c by {u, x, y}.) Suppose we were 
initially ignorant about whether a is true or not but now have two sources of 
evidence, the first telling us that c is true, the second telling us that ~c is true. 
Since neither evidence lends any support o a, Supp(a) = 0. 
Let Supp(a I b) represent the support for a given that I learn new evidence 
b. Given b, the first evidence supports a, so Supp(a] b) should certainly be 
greater than 0, and similarly, given ~ b, the second evidence supports a, so 
Supp(a] ~b)  > 0. Therefore a measure of the support that evidence gives 
should not obey the sandwich principle. 
However, since we're in a state of prior ignorance, this result should 
transfer to a measure of belief as well-- in the absence of prior information, a
measure of belief should depend only on the evidence, that is, the information 
summarized by the support function, and belief should thus be a strictly 
monotonic function of support. This means that since Supp(a) is less than both 
Supp(a[ b) and Supp(a[-~b), Belf(a) should be less than Belf(a[ b) and 
Belf(a[ -~ b), thus spoiling the sandwich principle for belief also. The sandwich 
principle is thus incompatible with an adequate representation f ignorance. 
Pearl's argument seems to be that, since given b we have some belief in a, 
and given ~ b we have some belief in a, we therefore must have some belief in 
a without knowing either b or -~ b. But neither of the evidences in any way 
supports a, and thus we are completely ignorant about the truth of a, so why 
should we have a nonzero belief in a? 
A Bayesian cannot have Belf(a) = 0 because this means for him essentially 
that a cannot happen; he might look at the frame O and then decide that 
Belf(a) should be 1/3; but the choice of frame was arbitrary; if instead we had 
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set 
0 = {U, 01 . . . . .  1/12' Wl . . . . .  W12' Xl . . . . .  Xl2, Yl . . . . .  Y12' Z} 
representing b by {u, u I . . . . .  Ol2 , w I . . . . .  w12 }, etc., that Bayesian would 
then have calculated Belf(a) to be 0.04. 
5.2. Likelihoods and the Sandwich Principle 
The likelihood ratio Le(a) is defined as Pr(e I a)/Pr(e I ~a) for hypothesis a
and new evidence e. We wish to condition on proposition b. Pearl, rightly I 
believe, allows b to be treated as either a piece of new evidence or an added 
assumption (P.3.2). 
Treating b as a new piece of evidence means that the conditional likelihood 
ratio would be defined as Le^b(a ). It turns out that this type of conditioning 
does obey the sandwich principle. If, on the other hand, we consider b as an 
assumption or context so that the conditional ikelihood ratio Le(a [ b) is 
defined by Pr(el a, b)/Pr(e I ~a, b), then the sandwich principle is spoiled. 
To show this, one need only use an example demonstrating Simpson's paradox 
(Simpson [20], Pearl [1, p. 495]) or take Pr(a) = Pr(b) = 1/2, Pr(b I a) = 
7/8, Pr(el a, b) = Pr(el-~a, b) = 9/10, Pr(el a, -~b) = Pr(el-~a, -,b) = 
1/10. This leads to Le(a I b) = Le(a I - 'b)  = 1, but Le(a) = 4. 
Now suppose we know only the values of the likelihoods Le(a I b)= 
Le(a I --'b) = 1, Le(a) = 4 and we are ignorant about the priors. By Bayes' 
rule, Oe(a ) = Le(a)O(a), Oe(a I b) = Le(al b)O(al b), and Oe(a I -'b) = 
L~(al--,b)O(al--,b), where O(a) is the prior odds for a, Oe(a) is the 
posterior odds for a after learning evidence e, etc. 
I f  a uniform prior is used, then the posterior odds are proportional to the 
likelihood ratios. The likelihoods do not obey the sandwich principle, so how 
can the posteriors? 
Consider O(a). The most sensible value one can give for this is 1, that is, 
P(a) = 1/2, using the principle of indifference. This gives the posterior 
Oe(a ) = 4, so Pr~(a) = 0.8. Similarly, we can consider just O(al b); again 
the most sensible value that this can be given is 1, leading to Pre(a I b) = 0.5. 
Using the same argument, the best value we can give to Pre(a I -,b) is 0.5. 
Thus the best values we can individually give to Pr~(a), Pre(al b), and 
Pre(a I--' b) do not obey the sandwich principle. 
Obviously, these values taken together are not probabilistically coherent. 
Thus, any posterior probability function must differ in at least one of these 
three values, and so must be, in some sense, suboptimal; in particular, a 
uniform prior is inconsistent with the likelihoods. Any prior with Pr(a I b) = 
Pr(al -~ b) turns out to be probabilistically incoherent, so we must set Pr(a[ b) 
> Pr(a I ~b)  or Pr(a I b) < Pr(a I -~b) despite the fact that the information 
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given in the problem is symmetric with respect o b and -7 b. Therefore, no 
single prior probability function is adequate for this problem. 
Now consider the following situation. We are given just the likelihoods 
Le(a I b) = Le(al~b) = 1 and are ignorant about priors. Using symmetry, or 
the principle of insufficient reasons, gives Pr(al b) = Pr(a l -~b)  = 0.5, lead- 
ing to Pr~(al b) = Pre(al-~b) = Pr~(a) = 0.5, which then implies that Le(a) 
= 1, an unreasonable conclusion. The supposedly noninformative priors allow 
one to deduce that the sandwich principle holds for these likelihoods, which is 
essentially the same as assuming that Simpson's paradox does not occur. 
5.3. Random Probabilities and the Sandwich Principle 
At my favorite restaurant there are two possible starters, avocado r prawn 
cocktail, and each may be served with a roll and butter or not. I, however, 
have no choice in what I receive, it being decided by the waiter, who uses the 
following compound experiment. 
First, numbers p, q, re  [0, 1] are picked randomly with some unknown 
distribution. Let s = pq + (1 - p)r. All I know about he random generation 
process is that the expected value of s, E[s], is 0.2, and E[q] = E[r] = 0.5. 
[There is nothing contradictory in this; for example, the random generation 
process may be picking (p,  q, r) = (1/8, 9/10, 1/10) with probability 0.5, 
and picking (p,  q, r) = (7/8, 1/10, 9/10) with probability 0.5.] 
Then I am given a roll and butter (b) with probability p, and 
1. If b, then I'm given avocado (a) with probability q. 
2. If -,b, then I'm given avocado with probability r. 
I'm interested in the values q, r and s, i.e., the probabilities Pr(al b), 
Pr(a I-~b) and Pr(a) in the random starter generation. But the best value I can 
give for q, and r, is 0.5, and the best value I can give for s is 0.2, again 
spoiling the sandwich principle. 
5.4. Lower Probability and the Sandwich Principle 
One week, to supplement my income I decided to venture into the catering 
industry. I made, with the help of many friends, a very large number of 
sandwiches, half with brown bread, half with white bread, which I intended to 
sell to various shops. 
The shops require that at least 70% of the sandwiches they receive be of top 
quality (A grade), and I spent considerable time checking that 75 % of the 
sandwiches I made were A grade. Unfortunately, I then found out that all the 
shops I had been intending to sell to wanted either only brown bread sand- 
wiches or only white bread sandwiches. 
I pick one of my sandwiches at random. Let a represent that it is of A grade 
quality, and b represent that it is made of brown bread. Pr(a) = 0.75 and 
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Pr(b) = 0.5. The bounds for Pr(al b) are 0.5 < Pr(aJ b) _< 1, and those for 
Pr(al-~b) are 0.5 < Pr(al-~b) _< 1. Thus if Pr. is the lower probability 
function, then Pr.(a) = 0.75, Pr.(al b) = Pr.(a[ ~b)  = 0.5, spoiling the 
sandwich principle and showing that we cannot be sure that the collection of 
brown bread sandwiches and the collection of white bread sandwiches are up to 
the required quality. 
Consider eplacing the use of lower probability by a measure Belf that obeys 
the sandwich principle, such as probability. It is natural to set Belf(a) = 0.75, 
and, since the problem is symmetric with respect to b and ~ b, we should have 
that Belf(a I b) = Belf(al ~b).  But then by the sandwich principle Belf(a[ b) 
= 0.75, suggesting that the brown bread sandwiches are up to the required 
standard--which is surely the wrong answer. 
It is very easy to find examples where lower probability spoils the sandwich 
principle much more dramatically; for example, see Section 4. The main point 
of this example was to show that spoiling the sandwich principle is no flaw of 
lower probability; in this example it is the lower probability in which we are 
interested, and to give a satisfactory answer it must spoil the sandwich 
principle. 
5.5. The Philippe, Pearl, and Mary Problem 
A patient has exactly one of a set of diseases O = { a 1 . . . . .  al0oo}, and 
Mary is attempting to deduce information about which. A certain test on the 
patient is taken; let c mean that the result of the test is positive and -~c mean 
that it is negative. Unfortunately, Mary has no prior knowledge about the ai's 
or c. She has two sources of evidence--both equally and very reliable doctors 
who were involved in performing the test but who unfortunately completely 
disagree about he result of the test. Dr. Philippe says c is true; Dr. Pearl says 
-~c is true. Both of them would normally respect he other's opinion, but in 
this case they are aware of the disagreement, and each still strongly believes 
his own statement. 
Take frame fl = O × { c, -~c}, and for each i define b i to be the proposi- 
tion a; ~ c (i.e., b i is true if and only if a~ and c have the same truth value), 
which corresponds to a subset of ft. 
Suppose that Mary is a Bayesian and that P is the probability function on fl 
measuring her degrees of belief after receiving the two evidences. By symme- 
try P(a  i) = P(aj)  for each i, j = 1 . . . . .  1000. Thus P(a l )  = 0.001. 
It must be the case that P(a  I I hi) = P(al  I-~bl), also by symmetry (this is 
so because given a I Dr. Philippe supports a I and Dr. Pearl supports -~a I, and 
given --,b I Dr. Pearl supports al and Dr. Philippe supports ~a~).The sand- 
wich principle then implies that P (a l [  bl) = P(al )  = 0.001. 
This means that, after learning bl, Mary is 99.9% certain that the patient 
does not have disease al despite the fact that she was initially completely 
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ignorant about the truth of a t, and of the two sources of evidence, one of 
them, Dr. Philippe, believes very strongly that the patient has a r Mary's 
degree of belief therefore seems completely unreasonable, as she is almost 
completely disregarding one of the two equally strong evidences; her certainty 
in - ,a t is quite unwarranted and could potentially be dangerous. 
REMARKS (i) The same argument works also for other measures of belief. 
I f  P is a subadditive measure of belief obeying the sandwich principle, then 
we deduce that P(al ]b l )  <_ 0.001. This shows that the argument is against 
the sandwich principle rather than another argument against the Bayesian 
representation of ignorance (though they are connected; in Section 5.1 it is 
argued that the sandwich principle is incompatible with an adequate representa- 
tion of ignorance). 
(ii) The problem is symmetric with respect o the ai's and also between b l 
and ~ bl. Because of this it was assumed above that P should also have these 
symmetries. Though it would be extremely hard to justify a P without these 
symmetries, this assumption is not, in fact, essential. It must be case that for 
some i, P(ai) < 0.001, and so by the sandwich principle P(ail d) <_ 0.001 
for either d = b or d = -1 b. The argument then proceeds as before. 
(iii) It was not necessary to say how to represent the two evidences in a 
Bayesian model (if a larger frame were used, it must be a refinement of 9, and 
the argument above still applies) or even to say exactly how strongly the 
doctors believed their statements--the argument above shows that, in this 
problem, the sandwich principle makes these issues irrelevant! 
(iv) If the problem was simplified by not introducing c and the bi's so  that 
Dr. Philippe's evidence was just a t and Dr. Pearl's just -~a t, then Mary's 
posterior probability for a t would be sensible, about 0.5, since Dr. Philippe's 
evidence would be considered more surprising and thus get a higher likelihood 
ratio. 
(v) It was not necessary to assume complete ignorance about the ai's; it just 
makes the argument clearer. If Mary had some weak prior information, she 
should still not be 99.9% certain that Dr. Philippe's evidence is wrong. 
(vi) A possible defense of Mary's degree of belief might be that Dr. Philippe 
on learning b 1 would radically change his mind about c. This would make 
sense if he originally had strong evidence implying that a t was false, but since 
he was initially ignorant about the truth of a t, why should he change his mind 
much on learning that his statement implies at? After all, a I was entirely 
possible, and he was pretty certain that he observed c. 
It is perhaps regrettable that the sandwich principle is not a principle of 
plausible reasoning. Suppose we use an adequate measure of belief for this 
problem, getting, say, Belf(al I b 0 = Belf(al I - ,b 0 = 0.495 (for example, if 
we used a Dempster-Shafer approach, representing the evidences of Drs. 
Philippe and Pearl by simple support functions with mass 0.98 assigned to c 
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and --'c, respectively). By symmetry, Be l f (a l lb i )=  Be l f (a i l - - ,b i )=  0.495 
for all i. 
Now suppose that, for each i, there is at Mary's disposal a test Test/ that 
determines if b i is true or not. She can then choose (deliberately, randomly, or 
unconciously) any a i to have highest belief after the next piece of evidence. By 
performing Test/her belief in a i will become 0.495, much higher than that for 
any other disease! This is not perhaps o strange--in life, our beliefs to some 
extent are determined by, and determine, the evidence we look for--but it does 
serve to remind one that there is a limit to how objective a degree of belief can 
be. 
6. THE REPRESENTATION OF IF-THEN RULES 
In Section 2.3 of his paper, Pearl criticizes the way a rule " i f  a then b 
with certainty et" is often represented in Dempster-Shafer theory, that is, by 
a simple support function with mass o~ attributed to the proposition a ~ b. In 
this section it is shown how this representation f rules can be given a sound 
and natural interpretation. It is hard, then, to understand Pearl's claim (P.6) 
that Dempster-Shafer theory is not applicable for domains in which rules 
tolerate exceptions, including default reasoning; indeed, the limit of this 
Dempster-Shafer representation f rules is a special case of Reiter's default 
logic (Wilson [21]). Pearl suggests that rules should be interpreted as a 
conditional probability; there are, however, considerable problems with this 
interpretation, and, in any case, it does not seem credible that this is the only 
type of i f - then rule. 
6.1. An Interpretation of Dempster-Shafer Rules 
In the introduction to his book on uncertainty, Pearl writes "uncertainty 
measures characterise invisible facts, i.e., exceptions not covered in the 
formulas" (Pearl [1, p. 2]). It then seems natural to represent an expert's rule 
If a then b: (a)  by an underlying logical relationship (n A a) ~ b, where n is 
an unknown condition (or possibly just one that is hard to express) that the 
expert expects to be true ot of the time. 
As it is logically equivalent o n ~ (a ~ b), this rule may also be inter- 
preted as 
In a proportion ot of worlds (or situations), we know that the material 
implication a ~ b is true. 
But this conveys the same information as a simple support function with mass 
a attributed to a ~ b, that is, the Dempster-Shafer representation f rules 
mentioned above. With a number of these rules, the combination using 
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Dempster's rule corresponds just to a lower probability given natural assump- 
tions on the n's, the unknown conditions (Wilson [21]). For the purposes of 
this paper such a rule will be referred to as "the DS representation f rules," 
though other representations within Dempster-Shafer theory are possible. 
6.2. Properties of DS Rules 
Here the properties of DS rules that Pearl criticizes are explained: Contrapo- 
sition one would normally expect, and chaining and reasoning by cases follow 
just from making the natural assumption that the unknown conditions of the 
two rules are independent, very similar to the assumption Pearl makes for 
noisy OR gates. 
CONTRAPOSITION Because n A a --' c is logically equivalent o n ^ -~ c --. 
-1 a, this type of rule allows contraposition. 
I agree with Pearl that the contrapositive of  a plausible rule is not necessarily 
plausible. For example, take the rule "Typically males don't have long 
beards." However, unless one is explicitly told otherwise, one would normally 
assume that a rule contraposes. To use Pearl's example (P.2.3.3), if all I am 
told is that " I f  a person is an orthodox Jew then that person refrains from 
eating pork, with certainty 0.999" and that Joe eats pork, then it seems natural 
to deduce that Joe is not an Orthodox Jew. 3 
CHAINING These rules also naturally chain; n 1 A a ~ b and n 2 A b "-* c with 
Pr(n/) = ot i, i = 1, 2, leads to n A a --' c, where n - (n  I A n2)  , and Pr(n) = 
OtlOt 2 if we make the assumption that n 1 and n 2 are independent. 
One would normally expect rules to chain. I f  one knew rules " i f  a then b"  
and " i f  b then c"  and then learned a, one would usually deduce c. However, 
as Pearl points out (P.2.3.1) there are times when rules should not be allowed 
to chain; in particular, predictions should not trigger explanations, and so 
Dempster's rule should not be applied. 
To say that the above pair of  DS rules do not chain is just saying that n~ and 
n 2 is an impossible event, or Pr(n I A n2) = 0. Therefore, to calculate belief 
when there is a known procedure for determining if a pair of rules should not 
chain (or a list of all such pairs) requires only slight amendment to the usual 
simple and efficient Monte Carlo algorithm (Wilson [21, 22]): Suppose the 
rules If  a i then bi: (t~i) for i = 1 . . . . .  m are known, and, for some 
proposition c, we want to find Bel(c). A large number of trials are performed. 
3Indeed, logical rules not allowing contraposition have a rather odd property: If "if a Ihen b" 
is such a rule and we learn -~b, then we cannot deduce ~a despite the fact that if we learned a we 
would deduce acontradiction. 
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For each trial, 
1. (a) For i=  1 . . . . .  m 
include i in o with probability oti; 
(b) I f  (i) {a i ~ bi: i~a}  is contradictory 
or (ii) a includes a pair of  rules whose chaining should be suppressed 
then Restart trial; 
2. I f  {a i ~ bi: i~a}  allows one to deduce c 
then trial succeeds, 
else trial fails. 
The proportion of trials that succeed then converges to Bel(c). 
The only difference with the usual algorithm is the addition of condition (ii). 
REASONING BY CASES Given two rules I f  a then b: (a~) and I f  -~a then b: 
(or2), which we will interpret as uncertain material implications n~ A a ~ b 
and n 2 A ~a ~ b with Pr(ni) = ot i, i = 1,2. Again assuming independence 
of the ni's we get Pr(b) >_ Pr(n I A n 2) = O~lOt 2, so Bell(b) = oqct 2. 
The reason the lower probability Bel(b) is as low as this is that in worlds 
where n I ^ -~n 2 is true, b may be always false if a is always false; in the 
event ~n~ A n 2, b may be always false if a is always true; and in the event 
-~n~ A -~n 2 there is no constraint on b so b may again always be false--in this 
case Pr(b) actually equals OtlOt 2. 
A Bayesian interpretation of  i f - then rules may well be in terms of likeli- 
hood ratios (see, e.g., Pearl [23]), but any such representation is also suppos- 
edly " in  clear violation of  common sense" (P.2.3.3) since given rules I f  a 
then b: (0.99) and I f  -~a then b: (0.99) it could be the case that Pr(b) is 
small if the prior probability of  b was very small. 
Those familiar with Pearl's noisy OR gates may have noticed the close 
connection; exception independence, where "Each exception to normal be- 
haviour acts as an independent variable" (Pearl [1, p. 185]) is essentially the 
assumption used above to deduce the chaining and reasoning by cases behavior 
that Pearl criticizes. 4
There will be many cases where the use of the simple independence 
assumptions between the ni's is not appropriate. Arbitrary probability func- 
tions over the ni's could instead be used, representing correlations between 
rules, a simple case of  which is suppressing chaining as described above. The 
Monte Carlo algorithm can again be used, with modification of step 1, to 
calculate the values of Bel (which will still be a belief function) and will be 
efficient if the representation of  the probability function is efficient. For 
example, if the probability function (i.e., the correlation information about the 
4Pearl himself is aware of the connection with noisy OR gates: see Pearl [1, p. 446]). Exception 
independence is one of the two assumptions of noisy OR gates, where there are two causal 
conditions of a variable. 
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rules) is represented by a Bayesian network (Pearl [1]), then a single trial of a 
Monte Carlo algorithm on this network could be used for step 1, to generate tr. 
Another example of where Dempster's rule should not be used is in Pearl's 
reasoning by cases examples (P.2.3.3). These would be better epresented by 
the use of a constant belief function. In the first, the set of three rules would be 
represented by a belief function with Bel[(M ~ O) A ( J  ~ O) ^  (C ---, O)] = 
0.001, BeI[(M---, O)A( J~  O)] = 0.7, and Be l (M~ O) = 0.9, M stand- 
ing for Muslim, etc. 
6.3. Conditional Probability Interpretations of I f -Then Rules 
Pearl suggests a conditional probability interpretation of rules: If a then b: 
(a) gets interpreted as a conditional probability Pr(b[ a) = c~; indeed, in Pearl 
[1, p. 450], he appears to go further when talking about default rules (i.e., 
logical representations of uncertain rules) when he says that the "proper 
interpretation" of rules is by conditional probability statements with probabili- 
ties close to 1. This extreme position seems rather implausible when one 
considers the many different ypes of rules that philosophers and logicians have 
invented. 
There are a number of problems with conditional probability interpretation 
of rules: 
1. Rule does not adequately represent support. If an expert tells us a 
rule, I f  a then b" (0.3), intending to give weak support o the rule, she 
would be horrified to then discover that it had been interpreted as 
Pr(~b[  a) = 0.7, equivalent to the rule I f  a then -~b: (0.7). 
2. Consistency. If we learn two rules If  a then b: (0.6) and I f  a then b: 
(0.62), then the knowledge base is inconsistent, and similarly if we learn 
from one expert hat I f  a then b: (0.7) and from another that I f  a then 
-~ b: (0.4), then again inconsistency results. This is a problem caused by 
the constraints being hard, as opposed to the soft constraints of the DS 
representation (see Section 6.4). 
3. Contraposition. One would normally expect a rule to contrapose, as 
pointed out in Section 6.2.1, but this type of rule does not naturally do 
SO. 
4. Chaining. Take two rules 
I f  my alarm clock wakes me up then I'l l catch my train (0.99), and 
I f  I catch my train then I won't be late for work (0.99). 
Given that my alarm clock does wake me up, it seems natural to deduce that 
I probably won't be late for work. However, using a conditional 
probability interpretation of these rules, one cannot deduce anything 
about the probability that I won't be late for work. 
5. Irrelevant information nullifies rules. Given the rule I f  Orthodox- 
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Jew(x) then Observe(x): (0.999), on learning new facts Orthodox- 
Jew(joe) and Has-Sister(joe), we cannot deduce anything about whether 
joe observes or not. 
The fourth and fifth problems, and perhaps the third, mean that some sort of 
"independence" or "irrelevance" assumptions must be made (then maybe use 
a lower probability approach, given these assumptions and the constraints 
generated by the rules) to make such an interpretation of rules practical. For 
the limiting case, where the certainties of the rules tend to 1 (Adams's logic of 
conditionals), Geffner and Pearl have made progress, defining an " irrelevance" 
predicate (Geffner [24], Pearl [1, p. 493]), but it is not easy to see how such an 
approach could be generalized for the usual, noninfinitesimal, case. 
An alternative idea, also explored by Pearl [1, p. 491] for the limiting case, 
is to use maximum entropy to pick a single probability function given the 
constraints. As indicated in Section 3.1, it is not clear to me that this approach 
can be guaranteed to give sensible results. 
6.4. Different Types of Rules 
Other representations of rules have been suggested, representing the rule If 
a then b: (c0 by Pr(b I a) _ ot and by Pr(a --, b) _> or. These also suffer from 
problems mentioned above, though they are both (especially the former) also 
plausible representations of certain types of rules. 
An important difference between these rules and DS rules is that the latter 
treat a rule as a "soft constraint," so that if a rule is contradicted to some 
degree by other rules then its reliability is reduced. For example, fact a and 
DS rule If a then b: (0.4) lead to Pr(b) _> 0.4, and so Bel(b) = 0.4, but 
adding an extra rule If a then -~b: (0.5) would reduce the reliability of the 
first rule, thus reducing Bel(b). 
The other representations mentioned treat rules as hard constraints--the 
reliability of a rule is not changed by learning other rules that contradict i . 
This condition is a convenient but strong condition, it treats rules as absolute 
rather than as objects that should be conditioned on other information received. 
There are clearly many representations of rules. For example, (i) representa- 
tions that use hard rather than soft constraints and (ii) representations based 
upon making the material implication uncertain, which allow contraposition, 
and those based upon conditional probability, which do not always allow 
contraposition. There are also (iii) representations in which rules act as 
supports, so that given fact a and two such rules of the form If a then b: 
(0.3), the belief assigned to b will be higher than 0.3. No single representation 
can be appropriate for all situations; instead, frameworks should be developed 
that can represent many different ypes. The DS rule, although representing a 
natural type of rule computationally efficiently, is, like the conditional proba- 
bility representation favored by Pearl, necessarily imited in its representational 
power. 
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7. DEMPSTER-SHAFER THEORY AS RANDOMIZED LOGIC 
Pearl's logic-based view of Dempster-Shafer theory is enlightening (P. 1.4). 
Artificial intelligence has recently seen an explosion in the development and 
use of nonstandard logics (see, e.g., Smets et al.[25], Ginsberg [26]). The 
additivity of conventional probability makes it very hard to sensibly define a 
probability function over logics, but uncertainty can be added to just about any 
logic in a natural and very simple way using a Dempster-Shafer approach 
(Wilson [21]). 
Imagine a system accumulating items of knowledge a i ,  i = 1 . . . . .  m, that 
are propositions in some logic, a i coming from source S i. In a straight logical 
approach the source is assumed to be completely reliable, and so a knowledge 
base K = { a 1 . . . . .  am} is built up. It is often desirable to be able to add 
degrees of certainty to the facts and rules in a knowledge base, so instead of 
assuming that each source S i is completely reliable, assume that each source 
has probability oti of being reliable; thus if E i is the event hat it is reliable, 
then E i = a i ,  and our prior probability of E i is ot i. 
In the straight logical case every proposition c was either deducible from the 
knowledge base K or not. Now, since the sources have only a probability % 
of being reliable, each a i is known only with probability ot i, and so c is 
deducible with only a certain probability. Bel(c) is defined to be the probability 
that c is deducible from the knowledge base; Bel is, as Pearl eloquently puts it, 
the probability of provability. 
One could think of the knowledge base no longer consisting of a fixed set of 
propositions, but of random propositions, each a i being present only % of the 
time, so that other propositions will be deducible only a fraction of the time, 
this fraction being their belief. This view leads to a Monte Carlo algorithm for 
calculating belief. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
No single measure can capture all one's intuitions about belief. Although in 
many ways an attractive measure, Bayesian belief (as well as other measures 
that obey the sandwich principle) can exhibit counterintuitive behavior in 
situations of partial ignorance. Alternative models of belief, such as Demp- 
ster-Shafer belief and lower probability, which cope better with such situa- 
tions, need further exploration. In particular, more examples of their practical 
application are desirable. 
I argue in my reply to Glenn Shafer's paper (elsewhere in this issue) that not 
all belief function representations of evidence are appropriate for combination 
by Dempster's rule. For example, Bayesian belief functions in 
Dempster-Shafer theory cannot represent a Bayesian prior adequately, and this 
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is the cause of the counterintuitive r sults in examples uch as the three 
prisoners puzzle. The use of Dempster-Shafer belief functions to update a 
Bayesian prior (P.6) seems to me not to have been adequately justified. I 
believe that Pearl is right in suggesting that, although it represents certain types 
of evidence very nicely, the representational power of Dempster-Shafer theory 
is limited, and ways of mixing Dempster-Shafer representations with other 
representations of evidence should be looked into. 
Just as there are many plausible models of belief, none of which corresponds 
to all one's intuitions, there are many types of if-then rules, including the DS 
representation a d conditional probability, no single representation being al- 
ways completely adequate. Also when using the theory in a rule-based or 
logic-based system, Dempster's rule should not be blindly applied--care must 
be taken to represent any dependencies. 
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